Japan's Far Right in East Asian Geopolitics : The Anatomy of New Xenophobic Movements by Higuchi, Naoto
Japan’s Far Right in East Asian Geopolitics:  
The Anatomy of New Xenophobic Movements  
 
Naoto Higuchi* 
 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to explain the sudden rise and success of Japan’s xenophobic far right 
movements in the late 2000s. While older far right groups were royalists and 
anti-communists indifferent to immigration issues, new right extremists specialize in 
attacking Korean and Chinese migrants with strong xenophobic sentiments. Although far 
right movements accuse Koreans and Chinese of enjoying ‘special privileges,’ such 
accusations are ungrounded in reality. Yet far right movements have succeeded in 
recruiting many young supporters. Why is this the case? Based on in-depth interviews 
with new right activists, I aim to clarify what is behind the hate against Koreans and 
Chinese, focusing on the influence of East Asian geopolitical predicaments. I argue that 
the new xenophobic right is generated by entrenched cold war sentiments and the lack of 
reconciliation between Japan and other East Asian countries. The data reveal that new far 
right activists were first fascinated by historical revisionism that justifies Japan’s 
imperialism and/or outrages against the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea. 
They believe Japanese sovereignty is threatened by both South Korean and Chinese 
protests against Japan’s revisionism and the North Korean abductions. Far right activists 
then began to identify the Korean and Chinese governments with Korean and Chinese 
migrants, thereby regarding them as ‘enemies within’ who engage in subversive activities. 
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1. Introduction: Far right Movements in East Asia 
Undoubtedly, it is European countries that were the most influenced by far right 
movements and parties, but the scholarly focus on these countries has led to a 
Eurocentric understanding of the far right phenomenon. In fact, research on the far 
right initially focused on Western Europe, and eventually expanded, albeit in a 
limited fashion, to include Eastern Europe, North America, Australia and Israel. In 
her comprehensive analysis of the far right worldwide, Norris remarks as follows: 
 
In East Asia…Although these countries contain a variety of small right-extremist 
groups…, no relevant radical right parties were identified from standard reference 
sources.…. Political parties in the newer democracies of East Asia often tended to 
consist of elected legislators grouped around leadership factions and splinters, 
usually poorly institutionalized, with centrist competition, rather than presenting a 
clearly defined ideological profile, stable organization, and party program.  
(Norris 2005: 77) 
 
Her analysis is misleading in two ways. First, if her argument is correct, East 
Asian countries have never seen the rise of far right parties. However, far right 
parties can also be generated under newer democracies. In addition, Japan has a 
century-long experience of party politics. Secondly, though they have been 
politically negligible, there have been far right parties that originated from prewar 
fascist political organizations in postwar Japan. A new far right party called Ishin 
Seito Shinpu (New Wind Restoration Party) has also been running for Upper House 
elections since 1998, though it only gained a maximum of 0.3% of the total vote for 
proportional representation in 2007. In this sense, the paucity of research on Japan’s 
far right as well as Norris’s misleading conclusions are understandable if we consider 
the vast amount of literature on European countries in which “no party family has 
been studied as intensely as the populist radical right” (Mudde 2007: 2).  
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    Studying Japan’s far right warrants special attention in several respects. First 
and foremost, xenophobic movements have rapidly grown in the past few years, and 
have changed the characteristics of Japan’s far right organizations. Second, although 
Japan’s foreign population accounts for only 2% of the total population – a 
proportion much smaller than those of most European countries – over the last two 
decades, the foreign population has doubled in size to exceed two million. Third, 
while there are no important far right parties, Japan also sees far right politicians that 
are comparable to those in European countries. Lastly, the unique characteristics of 
Japan’s far right, as will be described below, require theories that are different from 
those based on European experiences.  
    In terms of the first point, there are old and new far right movements whose 
objectives are quite different from each other. On one hand, the former are royalists 
and anti-communists (Szymkowiak and Steinhoff 1995), with ideologies that are 
strongly inherited from prewar fascist organizations. Their main enemies were the 
Soviet Union and the Japan Teachers Union instead of migrants. In addition, the old 
right has also included quasi-outlaw cadres with connections to the mafia, making 
mass mobilization impossible. On the other hand, the latter is xenophobic, focusing 
on the “privileges” that former colonial citizens (mostly Koreans) enjoy. Since such 
new far right organizations were established in the last decade, thousands of ordinary 
citizens with little experience in social movements have mobilized through the 
Internet and taken to the streets over migration issues.  
 
2. The Puzzle 
At first sight, the rise of Japan’s new far right movements seems to be a symptom of 
convergence with the European far right. Yet, there is one crucial difference between 
the two. European far right groups are hostile to migrants who, according to 
xenophobic claims, have failed or will fail to be integrated into host societies. Such 
anti-immigrant ideologies such as cultural racism, welfare chauvinism and 
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Islamophobia are based on the premise that migrants are economically burdensome 
or culturally troublesome. They are also opposed to newcomers because they believe 
they will bring about troubles in the future. Behind the rise of far right parties lie 
widespread anti-immigrant sentiments (Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000; Brug and 
Fennema 2003).  
On the other hand, two thirds of Japan’s foreign population is composed of 
Koreans and Chinese. Far right movements attack mostly oldcomer Koreans and 
sometimes Chinese who are socially and economically well integrated in Japan. 
Figure 1 shows that the enrollment rates for high school differ greatly by nationality 
group.  The rate for Koreans is the highest among the foreign population groups, 
and is close to that of Japanese. The proportion of university graduates is lower for 
Japanese (see Figure 2), but this is because of the overall lower education levels of 
the elderly; Koreans achieved upward mobility because there is little difference in 
education attainment levels between young Japanese and Koreans (Kim and Inazuki 
2000). Despite discrimination in the labor market, Koreans, as a whole, gained 
relatively better-paid jobs by establishing their own businesses (see Figure 3). 
Chinese are also among the well-off newcomers as many graduated from Japanese 
universities and secured professional jobs in Japan.  
In the European context, such successful groups are unlikely to be attacked by 
the majority population. Rather, Brazilians and Peruvians, suffering from low 
socioeconomic status and poor educational attainment, would be harassed by far 
right groups if they were in Europe. To put it in another way, Japan’s far right attacks 
East Asian “model minorities.”  
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    My question is then: Why does the new far right target Koreans and regard 
them as threats to Japan? This appears to be a simple puzzle as many Japanese have 
looked down on Koreans. However, it is worth examining as things are not as simple. 
They should have been the target of assaults by far right groups if discrimination 
automatically generates organized racial harassment, but the old far right groups that 
attacked the Soviet embassy were rather indifferent to East Asian migrants, and these 
migrants were far from being an important target of far right groups until xenophobic 
groups were established in the late 2000s.  
 
3. Theory: From a Dyad to a Triad Model of Xenophobia 
(1) Dyadic Models for Far Right Movements 
In European countries, most studies on immigration and/or xenophobia are based on 
dyadic models that analyze the inclusion and exclusion of migrants vis-à-vis host 
societies. Liberal or policy-oriented studies focus on social/economic/political rights 
and the acculturation of migrants for gradual integration. Research on migrant rights 
completed the first stage when political rights of migrants were theorized in the early 
1990s (Brubaker 1989; Hammar 1990; Layton-Henry 1990). Migrants were 
expected to enter the inner circle of Figure 4 in the course of time. Although the term 
‘integration’ sounds assimilative, ignoring the distinctiveness of migrant groups, 
arguments on integration are based on the premise that migrants can be and should 
be included in host societies.  
    In contrast, far right groups assume that the integration of migrants is a 
pie-in-the-sky dream because they assert that migrants insist on maintaining their 
own ways while ignoring the rules and norms of host societies. Such racist logics of 
cultural threat were used by Front National since the 1980s and spread across Europe. 
The other logic of exclusion is ethnic competition, which regards the emergence of 
xenophobic movements as a result of competition over scarce resources (Olzak 
1992). Ethnic competition theory can also be applied to political competition, but 
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almost all studies on the far right focus on economic – more specifically, labor 
market – competition (e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000).  
 
 
    Despite these differences in extant theories on the emergence of the far right, 
these theories have one thing in common: they traverse the views of “methodological 
nationalism” and are based on a dyadic model of hosts and migrants in nation states. 
But such logic of integration can only be partially applied to Koreans in Japan. On 
the one hand, Koreans are socioeconomically integrated in Japan as I mentioned 
earlier (in terms of sociocultural aspects, see Chapman 2008 and Fukuoka 1993). On the 
other hand, normative discourses emphasize the “diasporic” nature of Koreans in 
Japan, and imply that they are not simply taking the path toward integration into 
Japanese society (Lie 2008; Ryang and Lie 2009). As I will examine in further detail 
in the following section, this is also related to my research question which focuses on 
the gap between Koreans as the socioeconomically integrated and Koreans as the 
Figure 4 A dyadic model of immigrant exclusion 
Note: Modified Hammar (1990: 17) 
Migrants/ 
non-nationals 
Nationals 
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target of xenophobic movements.  
 
(2) A Triadic Model for Far Right Movements 
Instead of the dyadic model, I propose a triadic model to explain the emergence of 
new far right movements in Japan (cf. Söderberg 2011a, 2011b). Here Brubaker’s 
work on East European nationalism provides clues to establish a necessary 
framework (Brubaker 1996). Analyzing a mosaic of nations in Eastern Europe, he 
focused on relations between the nationalizing state, national minorities and the 
external national homeland.  
Nationalizing states are “ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as 
nation-states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying degrees) the language, 
culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the 
nominally state-bearing nation” (Brubaker 1996: 57). In this paper, I classify Japan 
as a nationalizing state because of its inclination to mobilize nationalism for national 
integration in the post-cold war era.  
A national minority is “a dynamic political stance, not a static 
ethno-demographic condition. Three elements are characteristic of this political 
stance, or family of stances: (1) the public claim to membership of an ethnocultural 
nation different from the numerically or politically dominant ethnocultural nation: 
(2) the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethnocultural nationality; and (3) 
the assertion, on the basis of this ethnocultural nationality, of certain collective 
cultural or political rights” (Brubaker 1996: 60). Koreans in Japan are a special case 
of a national minority. Because they migrated from Korea to Japan as Japanese 
nationals until the dismantling of the Japanese empire in 1945, their postwar legal 
status has been determined by bilateral negotiations. Koreans distinguish themselves 
from other migrants because they were ‘past nationals’ under Japan’s colonial rule.  
According to Brubaker, “a state becomes an external national ‘homeland’ for 
‘its’ ethnic diaspora when political or cultural elites define ethnonational kin in other 
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states as members of one and the same nation, claim that they ‘belong,’ in some 
sense, to the state, and assert that their condition must be monitored and their 
interests protected and promoted by the state” (Brubaker 1996: 58). While studies on 
Koreans in Japan emphasize the importance of the Korean peninsula as the divided 
homeland, I would like to focus on the influence of bilateral relations on Koreans in 
Japan.  
 
    These features of Japan’s Korean population as a national minority are all the 
more important considering the East Asian geopolitical context. In general, the 
triadic model expects politics in-between: they demand various rights as local 
residents in host societies, while they sometimes get involved in bilateral conflicts as 
a national minority. In terms of the far right’s hatred against Koreans in Japan, it 
seems strongly related to geopolitical changes that occurred after the collapse of the 
Cold War. When Japan’s hypothetical enemy was the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War era, old far right groups “pilgrimaged” to the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, 
asserting with loud speakers to return the northern territory occupied by the Soviet 
Union. But such geopolitical concerns did not bring about attacks on Soviet nationals 
in Japan as the population was too small to assault. 
The end of the Cold War precipitated changing geopolitical conditions between 
Europe and East Asia. While Europe moved towards integration, East Asia saw 
various issues triggering turbulence in international politics within the region. 
Nationalizing  
state 
National 
minority 
 
Homeland 
Figure 5 Triadic model of migrant exclusion 
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Regarding the Japan-Korea relationship, among the issues at stake are “territorial 
disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands, the way history is portrayed in 
textbooks, whether Japan has apologized with sincerity for its past deeds in Korea, 
the ‘comfort women’ or Japanese prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine” 
(Söderberg 2011: 1). In addition, the abduction of Japanese by North Korea and its 
nuclear crisis further worsened the bilateral relationship. These tensions stem from 
the ongoing Cold War in East Asia and Japan’s failure to deal with its historical 
burden concerning its past deeds and reconciliations with neighboring countries 
which Japan invaded in the last century. These two factors make East Asian 
geopolitics unstable, thereby stunting the growth of regionalism (Rozman 2004).  
My hypothesis is that such geopolitical conditions underlie the emergence of 
new far right movements: The xenophobic sentiments of Japan’s far right movements 
are not generated by Korean migrants themselves, but have originated from a hatred 
for neighboring countries. The end of the Cold War shifted the rightists’ enemies 
from the Soviet Union to Japan’s East Asian neighbors who Japan must negotiate 
with to settle one dispute after another.  
 
4. Data 
The principal data for this paper was collected from 34 interviews with 33 far right 
activists conducted between February 2011 and June 2012. All informants were 
engaged in xenophobic movements. Despite the attention given to research on the far 
right in Europe, there are strikingly few scholars who have actually conducted 
interviews with activists (e.g. Art 2011; Berezin 2007; Goodwin 2011; Kimmel 
2007; Klandermans and Mayer 2006; Linden and Klandermans 2007; Virchow 
2007). This is due to limited accessibility to far right activist informants, who are 
typically engaged in violence and possess negative images of social scientists. Due 
to the lack of empirical data, it is, however, crucial to conduct fieldwork to analyze 
Japan’s nascent far right movements. I approached four far right organizations and 
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conducted interviews with their cadres. Four out of 33 interviewees were paid staff, 
while 29 were either working elsewhere or attending school as university students. 
Each interview lasted one to four hours and was recorded and fully transcribed by 
the author. Other characteristics are shown in Table 1.
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5. Analysis 
According to Table 1, the majority (18 out of 33) had no contact with migrants 
(or non-Japanese) before joining far right organizations. In addition, only four 
recognized the influence of contacts with migrants on their activities. In this sense, 
their xenophobic sentiments are far from based on their own experiences.  
 
Table 2  Factors that generate far right movements 
 National International 
Economic Ethnic competition Economic nationalism 
Sociocultural Racial threat Influx of East Asian culture 
Political Political dealignment East Asian geopolitics 
 
To verify the hypothesis, I will examine which factors were crucial for activists 
to join far right movements (Table 2). I asked the interviewees about critical events 
or initial concerns that led to participation. The dyadic model suggests that national 
(economic, sociocultural and/or political) factors are of significance, while the triadic 
model expects that international (especially political) factors will be of larger 
importance. I will illustrate the results by explicating findings from the interview 
data.  
 
(1) National-economic factors 
    None of the 33 interviewees made reference to national-economic factors and 
concerns such as job competition. Such results would seem surprising in the 
European context, but in Japan, it is only natural that ethnic competition will not 
generate far right movements. Due to the smaller proportion of migrants within the 
total population, coupled with low unemployment rates, it is unlikely that Japan will 
see the rise of far right movements due to national-economic factors.  
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(2) National-sociocultural factors 
    Six out of the 33 interviewees claimed that national-sociocultural factors 
influenced them. Two mentioned the local presence of migrant workers in the early 
1990s when Japan experienced its first postwar massive inflow of undocumented 
foreign workers. But they regarded this influx as threat to law and order rather than 
ethnic competition. Two other interviewees talked about the impact of the Chinese 
riot in Nagano during the Beijing Olympics torch relay. AA says: 
 
I watched the Chinese riot in Nagano during the Beijing Olympics torch relay. It 
was on the top web news of Biglobe (major Internet provider in Japan) and I was 
led to Youtube or another website. Then I saw a girl crying surrounded by Chinese 
national flags. I felt a sense of danger and thus I joined the free-Tibet movement.  
 
It was not only AA but also V who happened to watch xenophobic web videos 
while surfing the net: 
 
About two years ago, I just coincidentally encountered a speech of our president 
when I was surfing the net. Because it was one of the most viewed, I casually 
watched and found it full of impact. He not only spoke against the partial 
legalization of the Calderon family (Filipino irregular migrants applying for 
special permission for stay/residence), but he also did it in front of the Immigration 
Bureau Office. It was impressive.  
 
(3) National-political factors 
    Only four out of the 33 interviewees mentioned national-political factors. Two 
felt a sense of crisis that confusion would reign throughout the country when the 
centrist Democratic Party of Japan won the general election in 2009. At first they 
were not xenophobic and joined far right organizations for the purpose of protesting 
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against the DPJ government. Another interviewee, AG, has been engaged in far right 
activities for forty years. At first he was a royalist rather than xenophobe and had 
long been inactive due to frequent job transfers. After coming back to Tokyo, he 
found his field of activity in the following way: 
 
When I went to a lecture organized by a rightist organization in 2002 or 2003, 
Kenzo Yoneda, a former conservative members of parliament, spoke passionately 
about the risks of suffrage for foreigners. Surprised to hear it, I realized how 
terrible the issue was. 
 
(4) International-economic factors 
    None of the interviewees pointed out the influence of international-economic 
factors. Although there are some rightist factions that oppose global economic 
governance structures, such as WTO, IMF and APEC, they are not attracted to 
xenophobic activities.  
 
(5) International-sociocultural factors 
    Interestingly, two out of the 33 interviewees talked about the influence of the 
FIFA World Cup. Held in 2002 and co-organized by Japan and South Korea, South 
Korea won fourth place, a first time feat for an Asian country. X remarks as follows: 
 
It was South Korea’s anti-Japanese reports during the World Cup that drove me to 
activism. First and foremost, though it was to be held solely in Japan, the 
secretariat suddenly decided to co-organize just before the tournament started. At 
first I welcomed it. But they won out by unfair means and foul and never cheered 
on the Japanese team.   
 
(6) International-political factors 
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    As my hypothesis predicted, 15 interviewees mentioned international-political 
factors. Historical revisionism triggered eight activists. Historical revisionism should 
originally be regarded as a national-political issue, but they regarded it as a matter of 
Korean and Chinese intervention in Japan’s internal affairs. S explains: 
 
I was not a conservative from the beginning. One day, I happened to listen to a 
radio program that dealt with World War II. I got interested in it because it offered 
fresh viewpoints based on conservatism. So we can view history in a different way. 
Free from the leftist thinking that Japan started the invasion to trouble other 
countries, I found another historical reality. I came to understand that it was not 
invasion but self-defense and Japan’s effort to liberate of East Asia.  
 
In terms of response frequency, after historical revisionism comes abduction of 
Japanese by North Korea. This issue has raised Japanese nationalism resulting in the 
nationwide spread of support groups for the abductees. K notes:  
 
I used to vote for Socialists or Communists. The critical event was that of the 
abduction of Japanese by North Korea which was disclosed in 2002. In that year, I 
clearly felt like moving in the opposite direction. It was just a change in my 
mentality, but quite a few people changed their minds back after 9/17 (when Kim 
Jong-il recognized and apologized for the abductions during Koizumi’s visit to 
Pyongyang).  
 
    In addition to hate directed toward North and South Korea, China and the 
Chinese in Japan have become new targets. Seeing a newly emerging superpower, 
many Japanese feel threatened by China.  This has precipitated into xenophobic 
movements. Proclaiming himself as a non-xenophobe, interviewee I expressed his 
resentment of China’s arbitrary behavior and Japan’s weak attitude toward 
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diplomatic negotiations with China.  
 
The most decisive event was the territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands (in 
2010). I knew China was a country of rude behavior, but I was angry about the 
Japanese government’s responses rather than the actions of China. This is also the 
case with the dispute over Takeshima Island. I regret why this country cannot 
defend its own territory.  
 
6. Discussion 
    Results from the previous section are summarized in Table 2. The most salient 
feature of Japan’s far right/xenophobic movements is that they have not been driven 
by economic factors. This is quite different from their European counterparts that 
mobilize the working class by stirring up narratives about threats to the labor market. 
Furthermore, Japan’s activists are relatively educated. Seven are high-school 
graduates, three are vocational school (a kind of tertiary education) graduates and 23 
are university graduates or dropouts.  
    Secondly, as the racial threat model suggests, sociocultural factors have 
something to do with the rise of far right movements. However, only six 
interviewees mentioned “migration issues” as reasons for involvement. It should also 
be noted that the majority joined the movements without any contact with migrants. 
Moreover, the direct encounters with migrants that surfaced in the interview data did 
happen recently but in the 1980s and 1990s. This suggests that activism was 
triggered by “imagined” or “virtual” threats.  
    Thirdly, the majority of activists were attracted to movements with political 
interests. This is especially true for international-political issues. The results show 
that Japan’s far right movements are political ones, pointing to the need to study 
political – especially East Asian geopolitical – conditions that trigger the far right in 
Japan.  
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Table 2  Factors to generate far right movements 
 National International 
Economic None None 
Sociocultural (6) 
Influx of foreign workers 
Prejudice towards Korean 
neighbors 
Legalization of irregular migrants 
Chinese behavior for Beijing 
Olympics 
(2) 
FIFA World Cup 
Political (4) 
Change of government to DPJ 
Foreigner’s suffrage 
Human Rights Protection Law 
(15) 
Historical revisionism 
Abduction by North Korea 
Territorial disputes with China 
Anti-Japanese demonstrations in 
China 
Tiananmen square protest in 1989 
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